Making the Most of *Jones v. United States* in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory

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INTRODUCTION

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. United States, a majority of the justices appeared to recognize that under some circumstances aggregation of information about an individual through government surveillance can amount to a Fourth Amendment search. If adopted by the Court, this notion—sometimes called “mosaic theory”—could bring about a radical change to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, not just in connection with surveillance of public movements—the issue raised in Jones—but also with respect to the government’s increasingly pervasive record-mining efforts. One reason the Court might avoid the mosaic theory is the perceived difficulty of implementing it. This article provides, in the guise of a model statute, a means of doing so. More specifically, this article explains how proportionality reasoning and political process theory can provide concrete guidance for the courts and police in connection with physical and data surveillance.

In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court took a giant step into the modern age. Ignoring the insinuation of its own precedent, the entire Court, albeit in three separate opinions, signaled that technological tracking of a car can be a search under the Fourth Amendment. Even more importantly, all three opinions in Jones made statements that call into question the Court’s “third party doctrine,” the controversial notion that government officials need no justification under the Constitution to view or access any activities or information that can be viewed or accessed by third parties outside the home.

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1 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 29-36.
3 For one of the more recent, among dozens of, criticisms of the third party doctrine, see Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Third Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERK. TECH. L. J. 1239 (2009).
The decision in Jones is long overdue. Federal, state and local governments are rapidly taking advantage of advances in technology to keep tabs on their citizenry, in increasingly intrusive ways. Millions of times each year the police track individuals using technology attached to cars, as in Jones, or signals from phones or factory-installed transponders. Thousands of cameras, some with zoom and nightvision capacity, continuously scan hundreds of urban and suburban areas. Equipped with powerful magnification devices, drones are or will soon be flying over a number of jurisdictions. The capacity of computers to access, store and analyze data has made mountains of personal information—ranging from phone and email logs to credit card and bank transactions—available to government officials at virtually the touch of a button. Before Jones, the third party doctrine ensured that none of this activity was regulated by the Fourth Amendment.

Strictly speaking, even after Jones most of these investigative techniques remain unregulated as a constitutional matter. The precise holding of Jones, per Justice Scalia, was that when police attach a tracking device to a car they are engaging in a trespass on an “effect” that is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s declaration that “people shall be secure in their houses, persons, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.” While the majority went on to conclude that subsequent use of that device to track movements of the car constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, the key to the decision is the predicate trespass. None of the investigative actions described above, except for the type of tracking involved in Jones itself, involve a physical interference with property, which is the usual definition of trespass.

The majority did clearly hold, however, that if a trespass occurs the fact that third parties can observe the vehicle is irrelevant; a search has occurred. Moreover, five justices in Jones—Justice Sotomayor in a solo concurring opinion, and Justice Alito, joined by three others—were willing to go further. Justice Sotomayor wrote that, although unnecessary to decide the precise question at issue

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8 132 U.S. at 949.
9 Id.
10 See infra note 59.
11 The majority also made the intriguing statement that “no case” supports the proposition that a government action that would otherwise be a search is not a search if it only “produces public information.” 132 U.S. at 952.
in *Jones*, the Court would eventually need to recognize the ease with which technology enables the government to acquire personal information, chill expressive and associational freedoms, and abuse its power, and she strongly suggested that tracking even in the absence of trespass infringes reasonable expectations of privacy. Justice Alito similarly opined that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” In short, both concurring opinions endorsed what the lower court in *Jones* called the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, the idea that certain types of government investigation enables accumulation of so many individual bits about a person’s life that the resulting personality picture is worthy of constitutional protection.

The opinions in *Jones* thus open the door to a more expansive Fourth Amendment. But much needs to be worked out by the Court. At present the mosaic theory is little more than a name.

Taking a different tack than the voluminous literature that has grappled with this issue both before and after *Jones*, this article proffers a statute that attempts to operationalize mosaic theory, relying on two more basic concepts that I have developed in other work. The first concept is the proportionality principle, the idea that the justification for a search should be roughly proportionate to the intrusiveness of the search. The second is John Hart Ely’s political process theory. As applied to searches, this theory counsels that courts should generally defer to legislation authorizing searches of groups when the affected groups have meaningful access to the legislative process and the search is implemented in an even-handed fashion.

Of course, numerous other theories of the Fourth Amendment exist and might apply in this context. Some of them are described and compared in the following discussion. In part this article is an effort to persuade that these other theories do not work as well.

The primary goal of this article, however, is to provide a springboard for a much-needed codification of search-related doctrine. Among western countries, the United States stands out in its failure to provide clear statutory statements of the law governing police investigation. Codification might be particularly useful

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12 Id. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
14 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (2010) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’”).
16 One of the earliest purveyors of mosaic theory (although without using the label) was Richard H. McAdams, *Tying Privacy in Knots: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights*, 71 Va. L. Rev. 297, 318 (1985) (“when courts consider . . . fourth amendment rights, they should focus on both the aggregate of individual police encounters and the synergistic effects of pervasive police practice on society as a whole.”). One of the latest analyses of the theory is found in Kerr, supra note 15 (arguing that mosaic theory cannot be coherently implemented).
17 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
18 Cf. Craig M. Bradley, *Overview*, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY xv, xix (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) (“with the exception of the United States, all of the countries presented in the book, and most other countries, have a nationally applicable code of criminal procedure rather than relying on judicial precedents as the means of governing the criminal process.”).
in the surveillance setting. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated, “In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”

He continued, “A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.” The statute proposed in this article provides an example of the kinds of nuances that must be resolved in order to work through the Fourth Amendment’s application to government surveillance. At the same time, in many respects the statute goes beyond anything the Fourth Amendment requires, in either scope or detail. As such, it is truly legislative in import, not simply a summary of possible judicially-created minimum requirements under the Fourth Amendment.

After describing more fully the questions left open by Jones and how that case intersects with various Fourth Amendment theories, the article sets out the proposed statute. The statute begins with definitions of terms like “search,” “probable cause” and “exigency” and then proceeds to substantive regulation of “targeted searches,” relying on proportionality theory, and “general searches,” relying on political process theory. Each provision is followed by a brief commentary. A number of other issues—most importantly concerning use of information gathered through surveillance and sanctions for violations of the rules—are not addressed in the statute, but a few comments about these topics appear at the end of the article. Only by making explicit in this way the consequences of theory can theory be adequately evaluated.

**Questions After Jones**

The story of the Supreme Court’s conservative take on the definition of the word “search” in the Fourth Amendment is well-known. After years of defining this threshold question in property terms, the Court re-oriented search analysis toward a test focusing on reasonable expectations of privacy. On its face, that test appears to be broader than a property-based approach, as evidenced by the decision in the seminal case of *Katz v. United States*, which established privacy protection as the focus of Fourth Amendment protection. In that case, the Court held that electronic interception of a phone conversation taking place in a phone booth was a search despite the uncontroverted facts that the defendant did not own the booth, the bugging device would not have physically trespassed on it even if he had owned it, and the conversation intercepted was not an “effect.”

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19. 132 S.Ct. at 964.
20.  Id.
21.  See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (use of spike mike that intruded into wall a trespass, and therefore a search); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (use of detectophone that touched the outer wall of suspect’s office not a trespass, and therefore not a search); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438. 457 & 464 (1928) (tapping of telephone wires outside a suspects premises is not a search because no trespass occurred).
24.  Id. at 353 (“We conclude that . . . the ‘trespass’ doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
In the hands of the post-Warren Court, however, *Katz* has pretty much been limited to its facts in situations not involving a physical intrusion into a house, person, paper or effect. The Fourth Amendment remains tied to property concepts, largely because the post-Warren Court has subscribed to the notion that, when a trespass is not involved, the police are entitled to view or access anything a third party can view or access. Thus, *Katz* did not prevent the Court from holding that no search occurs when police observe, from navigable airspace, the fenced-in curtilage of the home; after all, the Court reasoned, members of the public in a plane or on a double-decker bus could have seen the same thing the police did. Similar reasoning led the Court to decide that people assume the risk that when information is handed over to third parties—including institutional third parties such as banks and phone companies—they cannot reasonably expect the information to remain private. In short, the third party doctrine has pervaded analysis of the search issue.

The *Jones* majority departed from this line of cases but only minimally so. The month-long tracking that occurred in *Jones* involved observation of public activity that could have been viewed by anyone and thus, under the third party doctrine, should have been exempted from Fourth Amendment restrictions. The Court held to the contrary, but only because the observation was facilitated by a physical trespass. That reasoning resonates with the property orientation of previous cases. In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion avoided the reasonable expectation of privacy test entirely. While he did not repudiate that test, he reasoned that, given the Fourth Amendment’s reference to persons, house, papers and effects, the Amendment also explicitly protects property interests. Thus, on the facts of *Jones*, the expectation-of-privacy test was not needed to resolve the case.

constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”)


Id. at 211 (“a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus”).

Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that government access to bank records is not a search because an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the government . . . even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“a person who uses the phone ‘voluntarily’ conveys the phone number to the phone company and ‘assumes[s] the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.’”).

The Court has actually developed three doctrines that implement the third party idea. The *knowing exposure* doctrine asks whether the activity observed by police was known or should have been known to the third party. The *general public use* doctrine determines whether police, standing on a lawful vantage point, rely on technology that is generally available to the public; this doctrine might leave unregulated use of binoculars to look inside a house. The *assumption of risk* doctrine posits that no search occurs when the government obtains information about a target from a third party that the target knows or should know has the information. See Christopher Slobogin, *Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?* in *The Future of the Constitution* 11 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes, eds., 2012).

132 S.Ct. at 949 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a”search.”).

Id. at 952 (“the *Katz* reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”) (emphasis in original).
In contrast, the five concurring justices signaled a readiness to abandon the link between physical intrusion and the Fourth Amendment and hold that, even when a trespass is not involved, public surveillance using technology can be a search, at least when it is prolonged. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, contended that the majority’s approach was too beholden to outmoded property concepts and insisted that the only question that should be asked is “whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” Under this approach, Justice Alito continued, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets” is not a search, but “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigation of most offenses” could be. This language echoed the lower court’s ruling, which had held for Jones on the ground that “when it comes to privacy . . . the whole may be more revealing than the parts.”

Justice Sotomayor’s position was, on the surface, similar to Alito’s and the lower court’s. She thought the question should be “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Going well beyond Alito’s concerns, however, she also stated that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” an approach she considered “ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”

Thus, after Jones five justices are positioned to declare that long-term tracking is a search in the absence of a trespass and the other four justices have not definitively rejected that idea. However, several other questions remain open:

1. Will Justice Alito’s distinction between long-term and short-term surveillance end up defining when a search occurs in public spaces and, if so, how distinguish the two? In other words, how should mosaic theory play out? Justice Alito was unwilling to draw any robust conclusions on this score, other than to say that the four weeks involved in Jones “surely crossed” the line.

2. If tracking is a search, does it always require probable cause? Although probable cause is usually required for a Fourth Amendment search, neither the majority nor the concurring justices in Jones flatly stated that the traditional rule applies to tracking.

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32 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
33 Id.
34 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
35 132 S.Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 957.
37 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
38 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation has occurred.”).
39 132 S.Ct. at 954 (stating “we have no occasion to consider” the government’s argument that something less than a warrant based on probable cause would have justified the search in Jones); id. at 964 n. 11 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the question of what restrictions the Fourth Amendment imposes on tracking “is not before us”).
3. Assuming probable cause or some other justification is usually required for technological tracking, at least if it is long-term, is that requirement relaxed or inapplicable in connection with investigation of “some offenses” (or “extraordinary offenses,” the term Justice Alito used later in his opinion)? If so, what offenses?

4. Reaching more broadly, does Jones’ treatment of tracking cases have implications for other situations that are encompassed by the third party doctrine, as Justice Sotomayor suggested? For instance, what if long-term tracking does not use technology? What if the government decides to access recorded data about a person that is possessed by a third party?

The statute proposed in this article will suggest answers to these questions. Before engaging in that relatively precise endeavor, however, it is necessary to flesh out some theoretical possibilities.

Fourth Amendment Theory

Since Katz, the Supreme Court’s focal point in determining whether a police action is a Fourth Amendment search has been privacy. Yet from its inception the reasonable expectation of privacy test has been attacked as unduly manipulable. In his dissent in Katz, Justice Black complained that “by arbitrarily substituting the Court’s language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution’s language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest concept of privacy.” While Justice Black did not agree with the defendant-oriented holding in Katz, he also presciently noted that the privacy concept could be abused in the government’s favor as well. Partly because they believe that the latter prediction has come to pass, many academic commentators have taken potshots at the reasonable expectation of privacy test and proposed substitutes, including formulations focused on property, coercion, mutual trust, liberty, dignity, and power.

40 Id. at 964.
41 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 374 (“The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers [provided by linking the Fourth Amendment to the “privacy” concept] in courts.”).
44 William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1020 (1995) (“Were the law of criminal procedure to focus more on force and coercion and less on information gathering . . . , it would square better with other constitutional law and better protect the interests most people value most highly.”).
45 Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen? 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1758-63 (1994) (“the animating principle which has been ignored in the current Fourth Amendment debate is the idea of reciprocal government-citizen trust.”).
46 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 661 (“the concept of dignity captures a core Fourth Amendment value that privacy does not, and therefore must be explicitly incorporated into reasonableness analysis.”).
There is no doubt that privacy is an amorphous concept, as well as one that is highly subject to change, given the whimsicality of public attitudes and the pervasive impact of technological advances. 49 Furthermore, as Justice Scalia has noted, the expectation of privacy test is “circular,” in the sense that expectations of privacy are reasonable only when the Court says they are. 50 I have argued that these objections can be partially overcome by tying privacy to positive law (including the law of property) and to empirical work on society’s views. 51 But it must be admitted that privacy is a very elastic animal.

Most of the other tests fare no better, however. Terms like “liberty,” “dignity,” “power,” “coercion,” and “trust” are hardly self-defining. And most of them do not help advance the ball. The entire Bill of Rights, from the First Amendment’s guarantees of speech and association through the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, is meant to protect liberty and dignity against government abuse of power. The issue in Fourth Amendment cases is the precise aspects of dignity, liberty and power that are implicated by searches and seizures. 52 Protection against physical coercion cannot be the answer if we want covert surveillance to be regulated. 53 And maximizing citizen trust of government, while certainly a reason to require justification for searches, doesn’t tell us when something is a search or what justification is required if it is a search. 54

That leaves property as a possible alternative touchstone for the Fourth Amendment, a notion that has taken on new life since Justice Scalia explicitly rejuvenated it in Jones. Several commentators have argued that property law provides a more concrete reference point for Fourth Amendment analysis than privacy does. 55 But property notions are also manipulable and changeable, and thus their content for Fourth Amendment purposes will, as with expectations of privacy, be entirely dependent on what the Court says. For instance, the Court has

47 Thomas Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment after Lawrence, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“Lawrence’s emphasis on liberty provides a fruitful way of reorienting Fourth Amendment protections when considering particular kinds of interpersonal relationships.”).
49 See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 45, at 1758-63.
50 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (the reasonable expectation of privacy test “has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”).
52 Thus Professor Ku, who argues that power is the linchpin of Fourth Amendment analysis, nonetheless circles back to privacy in defining why power is relevant. Ku, supra note 48, at 1326 (“the amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the people’s authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when government may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”). Most critics of Katz seem more bothered by the way the Court defines privacy than by privacy’s mismatch with the Fourth Amendment. Representative is Castiglione, supra note 46, at 660 (“As courts’ decisions have moved towards an almost exclusive focus on privacy as the counterbalance to the government’s law-enforcement interest, the government’s interests have increasingly prevailed and the sphere of protection afforded to the individual has shrunk.”).
53 See Slobogin, supra note 51, at 25.
54 Id. at 25-26.
55 For a post-Jones example of this stance, see Erica Rachel Jones, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68 (2012) (Jones’s “resurrection of the link between searches and property . . . is a substantial step toward” making the Fourth Amendment “more concrete”).
held that private property in the “open fields” is not part of the house protected by the Fourth Amendment.\(^{56}\) that garbage left at curbside is abandoned,\(^{37}\) and, prior to\(^{58}\)

_Katz,_ that bugging a phone line outside of a house is not a trespass.\(^{58}\)

For those who want to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment to cover technological surveillance, property is a particularly shaky basis for reform. Justice Scalia’s statement in\(^{1}\) _Jones_ that planting a GPS device on a car is a trespass has been castigated as inconsistent with both the historical and the modern understanding of trespasses on chattel, which usually requires significant physical interference with property.\(^{59}\) Scholars attempting to bring others types of surveillance under the property rubric have had to resort to even more exotic arguments. Interception of phone or computer communications and tracking using the signals from cell phones are said to be “trespasses” on the electronic particles sent by these devices.\(^{60}\) Aerial surveillance purportedly violates the common law doctrine of _ad coelum_, which grants property rights directly above one’s home (but, unfortunately for those who would like to regulate satellite and drone surveillance, nowhere else).\(^{61}\) And perhaps most creative of all is the assertion that people have a property interest in records created and maintained by third parties.\(^{62}\)

I am sympathetic with the outcomes of these arguments. But they have a legal fiction quality to them that is as tenuous as any argument based on privacy. Furthermore, any realistic property-based Fourth Amendment is likely to leave intact the most egregious aspect of the third party doctrine, its immunization of government acquisition of personal information held by third parties.\(^{63}\) I have contended that, with all of its flaws, privacy—defined loosely as the ability to

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\(^{56}\) Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“the term ‘effects’ is less inclusive than ‘property’”).

\(^{57}\) California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“having deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,’ respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.”).


\(^{59}\) For instance, calling _Jones_ an “historical fraud,” Peter Winn points out that, according to Blackstone, trespass to chattels required that the chattel “had been misappropriated or destroyed,” which clearly did not occur in _Jones_. Peter A. Winn, _Trespass and the Fourth Amendment: Some Reflections on Jones_, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/trespass-and-the-fourth-amendment-some-reflections-on-jones/. Winn also notes that Justice Alito, who quotes an eighteenth century treatise to the effect that damage to chattel is required for recovery, misquotes the relevant passage, which, consistent with modern law, is actually even more hostile to trespass to chattels as a cause of action. _Id._

\(^{60}\) See _Jones_, supra note 55, at 67-68 (“Even in the _Katz_ electronic surveillance case, the Court could have retained the connection between property rights and privacy rights by holding that an electronic connection to an individual’s property (or to the phone company’s property) is a physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level.”).


\(^{62}\) That is not to say an argument cannot be made in some contexts. See Jerry L. Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L. J. 1129, 1137 (1983) (“The Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act gave all citizens ‘property rights’ in the information held by government bureaus.”).

\(^{63}\) Winn, _supra_ note 59 (“the law of trespass, if it requires anything, requires a possessory interest; and the powerful intuitions of invasion of privacy today are triggered by the massive amounts of detailed personal information residing in the servers of third parties.”).
avoid intrusion into one’s affairs—remains the best basis for analyzing Fourth Amendment issues. On this assumption, I have taken the position that any government effort to observe or find out about a person’s activities, transactions or communications is a Fourth Amendment search. While this position is admittedly a significant departure from the Court’s approach, it conforms to the lay use of the word “search,” which, as Justice Scalia noted in *Kyllo v. United States*, means “[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection.”

As Justice Scalia goes on to suggest in his *Kyllo* majority opinion, the Court’s unwillingness to define search according to its plain meaning may be the result of a desire “to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.” In other words, because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence usually requires a warrant based on probable cause for any action denominated a search, the justices are loath to apply the search label to police actions—like looking into a house from the public sidewalk—that are often reasonable attempts to develop probable cause. Even liberal justices have had a hard time ignoring this reality.

Another approach—again suggested by Scalia in *Kyllo*—would be to adopt a broad definition of search, as suggested above, but to declare that certain searches are reasonable even when not based on probable cause. For some time I have been advancing an analogous approach, which I have called the proportionality principle. Simply put, the proportionality principle requires that the justification for a search be roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness. The Court has always used this proportionality reasoning in dealing with seizures, and on more than a few occasions it appears to have applied it to searches. In *Jones* itself, Justice Alito’s distinction between “prolonged” and short-term tracking could be seen as an application of the proportionality principle. The suggestion here is that this principle—although not necessarily the Court’s application of it—should be adopted as the means of determining the “reasonableness” of all searches.

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64 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 23-24.
65 Id.
67 Id. at 32 n.1.
68 Id. at 32.
69 For instance, both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined *United States v. Knotts*, holding that short-term tracking with a beeper is not a search, and only Justice Marshall was “adamant” about requiring a warrant in *Miller* and *Smith*, the bank record and phone record cases. SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 208.
70 The first article advocating this position was Christopher Slobogin, *The World Without a Fourth Amendment*, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68-75 (1991).
71 See, e.g., *Michigan v. Summers*, 452 U.S. 692, 697 (1981) (noting that in seizure cases that did not require probable cause the Court has held that “the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy ‘was so much less severe’ than that involved in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety’ could support the seizure as reasonable.”).
72 See, e.g., *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, . . . regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”); *O’Connor v. Ortega*, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987)(stating that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify search of an employee’s desk in part because “the employer intrusions at issue here ‘involve a relatively limited invasion’ of employee privacy.”).
However, I have also suggested two exceptions to the proportionality principle. First, the justification normally required by that principle should probably be relaxed when the search is designed to prevent a significant, imminent and specific threat. The law, including Fourth Amendment law, routinely relaxes restrictions on the government when its aim is to prevent serious harm.

The second exception arises when the government wants to search large groups of predominately law-abiding people—as occurs in connection with a drug testing programs, citywide camera systems, or a nationwide data-mining regime. Under today’s jurisprudence, many of these programs (for instance, camera surveillance of the public streets and mining information held by third parties) would not be considered searches at all. When they are said to be searches (as with drug testing), the Supreme Court’s approach has been to apply its “special needs” analysis, which has generally meant that so long as the government can demonstrate the group search meets a significant government need that is distinct from a general interest in crime control it is permissible, despite the lack of individualized suspicion. Academics have generally disagreed with the Court’s holdings, but have usually resorted to similar analysis in such cases by requiring the government to show that the search program addresses a particularly significant regulatory problem in the least intrusive manner possible.

I am not as confident that courts are equipped to measure the necessity for a group search or the usefulness and feasibility of its alternatives. In any event, I have suggested that application of John Hart Ely’s political process theory should be considered in this context. Ely argued that, when interpreting vague constitutional provisions such as the due process clause, courts should grant deference to legislative pronouncements—in other words, engage only in rationality review—if the affected groups had meaningful access to the legislative process and the statute is framed and applied even-handedly. A statute authorizing group searches could be analyzed in the same way. However, a group search program initiated solely by the executive branch is not entitled to judicial

74 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (justifying frisks on reasonable suspicion in part because of the need to protect the police); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (permitting commitment on clear and convincing evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt partly because the state should not be saddled with a standard of proof that “may completely undercut” its preventive efforts).
75 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
77 See Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 430-436 (1988) (arguing for application of a “compelling government interest–least intrusive means test” for “initiatory searches” for which there is no pre-existing suspicion); Thomas Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEMPHIS L. REV. 483, 618 (1995) (arguing that group searches ought to be analyzed by looking at “the absence of effective alternatives, the comparative productivity of operating without individualized suspicion, the need to achieve a high level of enforcement, and the inability to identify the source of the problem utilizing individualized suspicion.”).
78 See Slobogin, supra note 28, at 28-29.
79 Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (2010).
80 Ely, supra note 17, at 102.
deference. Furthermore, even when authorized by legislation such programs are vulnerable under political process theory if the affected group lacked representation in the decision-making body. Although the latter inquiry can be complex, the search context it can be operationalized in part by assuring that members of the decision-making body are subject to the program.

This discussion of Fourth Amendment theory has been an extremely brief summary of longer treatments. These more detailed works explain why the proportionality principle, the danger exception to that principle and political process theory are consistent with the fundamental values underlying the Fourth Amendment and why the restrictions they impose on investigative techniques that the Court has seen fit to leave unregulated are important. Enough has been said here, however, to set up the final section of this article, which presents a statute designed to implement these three concepts.

A Proposed Statute

The following statute is divided into two parts, a definition section and a section setting forth substantive rules governing the conduct of searches. To a large extent, it is meant to provide one possible implementation of the concurring opinions in Jones. It rejects the Court’s third party doctrine and accepts the “mosaic” notion that accumulation of publicly available information or information in the hands of third parties can be a search.

However, the statute also goes well beyond the innuendo in the concurring opinions in Jones. It regulates not only physical surveillance (for instance, tracking and camera surveillance) but also transaction surveillance (for instance, accessing digitized information). It also makes an important distinction between targeted searches and general searches, with the former regulated under proportionality theory and the latter regulated pursuant to political process theory. As a result, in some places (for instance, the definition of search or regulation of non-technological searches) the statute provides more protection than even a broad interpretation of the Jones opinions would contemplate; in others (for instance, the regulation of general searches) it may provide more or less protection than the Fourth Amendment does, depending on the context and how the Court’s precedents are interpreted. Each provision is followed by a short commentary explaining the black letter language and tying the provision to previous discussion.

REGULATION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES

PART I: Definitions

1) Search: An effort by government to find or discern something. A targeted search seeks to obtain information about a specific person or place in connection with a known criminal event. A general search

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81 See Slobogin, supra note 79, at 132-36 (discussing public choice issues).

82 A somewhat longer summary is found in Slobogin, supra note 28, at 23-31. For a full treatment of the proportionality principle, see SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 23-47. For a full treatment of the application of political process theory to the Fourth Amendment, see Slobogin, supra note 79, at 130-38.
seeks to obtain information about people or places that are not targets at the time of the search.

Commentary: The definition in this provision is broader than the Supreme Court’s definition of search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather than focusing on reasonable expectations of privacy and trespass, it straightforwardly defines search the way a layperson would and consistently with the plain meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It rejects the implications of the third party doctrine.

Crucial to note is that the definition does not differentiate between searches using technology and searches with the naked eye. The officer who watches an individual walking down the street to see what transpires is conducting a search under this definition whether she does so with her unaided vision, binoculars, closed-circuit TV, or a drone. The officer who peruses records is engaged in a search whether he does so manually or with a computer. Thus, this provision avoids tying the definition of search to problematic assessments of the search method used—such as whether it is general public use, enhances the normal capacity of the police, or is unusually pervasive or disruptive—that have bedeviled the courts. It also avoids tying the definition of search to whether and to what extent a physical intrusion is involved, whether the target has taken sufficient steps to enhance privacy, or whether the item or information sought is “intimate” as opposed to impersonal, all imponderable factors the courts have nonetheless felt compelled to consider under the Supreme Court’s test.

The subcategories of search defined in this provision are necessary for the purposes indicated in Part II, which treats targeted searches differently than general searches. Note that targets can be not only people but places. While targeted searches will usually be directed at a suspect, in some cases there may be no suspect but rather a specific place that is associated with completed or anticipated crime or other wrongdoing. Note further that if information is sought from third parties about a specific person or place it is a targeted search. If, on the other hand, the government is trying to solve, prevent or deter as-yet undetected or perpetrated crime through surveillance of the general population or a subset of it, it is carrying out a general search.

(2) Data Search: A search in the absence of explicit consent of digital, paper, audio or other information sources and records that is not governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Title III).

Commentary: This definition encompasses accessing phone and email logs, bank records, credit card records and any other records, but not interception of the content of phone or computer communications. The latter type of search generally requires a special warrant and is governed by Title III.

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83 As such this definition is very similar to a suggestion made by Daniel Solove. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1511, 1514 (2010) (“the Fourth Amendment should provide protection whenever a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular form of government information gathering.”).


85 Id. at 392-94.
(3) **Public search:** A search in the absence of explicit consent focused on activities or persons, limited to what the natural senses of a person on a lawful public vantage point could discern at the time of the search.

Commentary: This definition encompasses camera, drone, tracking and visual surveillance of all public spaces, of curtilage, and of home interiors viewable at the time of the search, if it takes place from a lawful vantage point. Thus a search of a home interior by an officer standing on the curtilage would not be a *public* search. Nor would a search of a home interior with binoculars be a public search if, “at the time of the search,” police are using the binoculars to avoid discovery or because naked eye observation is not possible for some other reason. Furthermore, a search would not be public if it involves using technology that can detect items underneath clothing or through opaque surfaces of cars and buildings.

In all of these situations, the provisions on public searches detailed in Part II do not apply. Generally, a warrant based on probable cause would be required, although there may be exceptions. In *United States v. Place*, the Court held that a dog-alert to the presence of contraband is not a search because it is “much less intrusive” than a typical search, and involves only the disclosure of an item in which, a later case explained, there is “no legitimate privacy interest.” Under the definition of search in these provisions, the dog sniff in *Place* would be a search, but might be considered reasonable given the lesser infringement on privacy.

(4) **Probable cause:** An articulable belief that a search will more likely than not produce significant evidence of wrongdoing. The belief may be based on statistical analysis.

Commentary: The Supreme Court’s definition of probable cause is extremely vague. An oft-quoted passage from the Court states that probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that evidence of crime would be found. In the case in which this language appeared, the evidence was

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86 As I have noted elsewhere, one needs to ask “[i]f naked eye viewing without physical intrusion could have occurred, why didn’t it? If the answer is (as it often will be) that the police were worried they would be discovered, thus leading the targets to stop what they were doing or to hide it better, then the interior details arguably could not have been seen with the naked eye.” Slobogin, *supra* note 51, at 64.


90 The Court will be addressing this issue in more detail in Florida v. Jardines, to be decided in the 2012-13 Term. The lower court in Jardines held that a dog sniff of a home conducted from the front door of the residence is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause. Jardines v. States, 73 So.3d 34 (2011). *Jones* suggests that a key inquiry will be whether the presence of the dog is a trespass on curtilage or instead can be viewed as justified through “consent” implied by the presence of a sidewalk to the front door and other indicia of welcome.

contraband. In dictum in another case the Court stated that probable cause would exist even if the items sought are simply “useful as evidence of crime.”

The definition in this provision is more precise, and perhaps more demanding, in two ways. First, it adopts the preponderance standard, which is likely the way most judges think about probable cause. Second, the definition also requires that the evidence sought be significantly related to wrongdoing rather than mere circumstantial proof of crime or other prohibited harm. Thus, for instance, even a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that a search will prove gang membership would usually not constitute probable cause under this definition, nor would a more-like-than-not showing that a search will reveal that the target frequents a particular place or knows certain people. Conversely, a demonstration by a preponderance that a search will produce illegal drugs or a murder weapon would constitute probable cause under this definition.

The last sentence in this provision and the next provision recognizes that suspicion may be based on an algorithm or profile that produces a 50% hit rate (a quantification of the preponderance standard). This situation could arise, for instance, if the government can demonstrate, using crime-mapping data, a more-likely-than-not probability that a crime will occur in a particular area.

(5) Reasonable suspicion: An articulable belief that a search will more likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing. The belief may be based on statistical analysis.

Commentary: The Court has indicated that reasonable suspicion is a more easily met standard than probable cause, but otherwise has provided little guidance beyond insisting that the police have more than an “inchoate or unpolarized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” The present definition more precisely communicates that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause by referring to an action’s capacity to “lead” to evidence (rather than “produce significant” evidence), which is often the goal of surveillance. For instance, in Matter of Application of USA, the court held that a warrant could not issue merely to obtain

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92 Specifically, the item seized was “intoxicating liquor” being transported during the Prohibition era. Id.
95 Cf. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1251 (2012) (Kagan, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing, in a case where the majority held that a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to seize evidence of gang membership from the Millender’s home, that “[m]embership in even the worst gang does not violate California law.”).
96 See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that under the preponderance standard, “the trier of fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater than 0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right”).
97 Cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing: The Future of Reasonable Suspicion, Emory L.J. (forthcoming) (discussing how police might use “historical data about a particular type of crime, the location and time of that crime, and plot those past crimes in a way that would inform crime analysts about an unusual cluster of crimes.”).
98 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
99 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Information, 2011 WL 3423370 (D.Md.), (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence neither sanctions access to location data on the basis of an arrest warrant alone, nor authorizes use of a search warrant to obtain information to
location data about an individual suspected of crime, because location is not “evidence of a crime.” However, under the standard in this provision, if the government can show that it has probable cause to arrest the individual, discovery of his location would more likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing, i.e., the suspect, and thus reasonable suspicion would exist.

(6) Court order: Judicial authorization for a search based on probable cause (in which case it is a warrant) or on reasonable suspicion, describing with particularity the person or place targeted and the evidence sought, and if applicable the duration of the search. No court order may authorize a search for more than 30 days, at which point a new showing of the requisite justification must be made.

Commentary: Given the language of the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be based on probable cause. However, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts are able to issue orders authorizing searches or seizures on less than probable cause. Current statutes, such as the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, also authorize court orders based on varying levels of justification. The 30-day limitation, analogous to the durational limitation imposed on electronic surveillance warrants, ensures that prolonged surveillance will be supported by new individualized or statistical justification.

(7) Exigent circumstances: (a) Circumstances that augur a serious and specific danger, in which case a search is permitted if a reasonable law enforcement officer would believe it is necessary to help avert the perceived danger; or (b) Circumstances involving imminent danger or disappearance of evidence that make obtaining a court order in a timely manner difficult, in which case only probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as the case may be, is required prior to the search.

Commentary: Subsection (a) implements the danger exception discussed earlier. It is meant to encompass national security crises and other significant emergencies, imminent or not. Subsection (b) is a standard definition of exigency focused on whether there is time to get an order. Subsection (a) is the only bow

aid in the apprehension of the subject of an arrest warrant where there is no evidence of flight to avoid prosecution and the requested information does not otherwise constitute evidence of crime.

Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984) (referencing this possibility with respect to tracking inside a home); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (“the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause.”).

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2705(d) (authorizing access to account logs and e-mail addresses, etc. if a court finds “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).


See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.

See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (indicating that the “correct standard” for gauging exigency justifying a warrantless intrusion is whether there is “‘hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.’”).
to Justice Alito’s suggestion in Jones that investigative techniques normally
governed by the Fourth Amendment should not be subject to constitutional
regulation when used to investigate “extraordinary offenses.” Otherwise, this
definition of exigent circumstances does not relax restrictions on searches based on
the nature of the offense. This stance is based on the assumption that a search for
an already-committed crime does not become less intrusive simply because the
crime is a serious one.

PART II: Regulation

(1) Targeted Public Searches
(a) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 48 hours in
aggregate requires a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist.
(b) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 20 minutes in
aggregate but no longer than 48 hours in aggregate requires a
court order unless exigent circumstances exist.
(c) A targeted public search that does not last longer than 20
minutes in aggregate may occur at a law enforcement officer’s
discretion whenever the officer believes in good faith that it can
accomplish a legitimate law enforcement objective.

Commentary: The concurring opinions in Jones suggest that mosaic theory is
in play when the government targets an individual. If so, some method of
measuring the intrusiveness of aggregated information is necessary. But neither
Justice Sotomayor nor Justice Alito attempt to explain how that theory might be
implemented. Doing so requires addressing a number of complicated issues.
Professor Orin Kerr’s list in this regard includes: (1) What test determines when a
mosaic has been created? (2) How should non-continuous surveillance be
analyzed? (3) What surveillance techniques are governed by mosaic theory? (4)
What level of justification is required to carry out a mosaic search? Professor
Kerr believes that these questions are “novel and difficult” and counsel against
adopting mosaic theory.

These questions are novel and difficult. But this provision, in combination
with the definitions already provided, does a passable job of answering them. Its
implementation of mosaic theory is based on application of the proportionality
principle’s stipulation that the justification for a search be roughly proportionate to
its intrusiveness. Taking a cue from Justice Alito’s use of the word “prolonged” to
describe the types of tracking he might consider a search, the provision’s
restrictions do not depend on the type of technique at issue but rather rely on time
as the relevant metric for determining intrusiveness. The provision draws the
probable cause line at 48 hours, the length of time the government may hold an

105 132 S.Ct. at 964.
106 For a lengthier argument, see Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis is Not
107 Kerr, supra note 15, at .
108 Id. at
109 Id. at
110 132 S.Ct. at 964.
arrestee before a judge must be consulted.\(^{111}\) It draws the reasonable suspicion line at 20 minutes, the outer limits of a permissible length of a street stop.\(^{112}\) Targeted public searches that last less than 20 minutes must still be justified, but need only be in pursuit of any “legitimate law enforcement objective.”\(^{113}\) Breaks in surveillance do not “restart the mosaic clock”\(^{114}\) but are aggregated to determine whether the 20-minute or 48-hour threshold is met.

Note that this provision does not require as much justification as would be required for physical seizures of equivalent duration. A seizure that goes beyond 20 minutes usually becomes the functional equivalent of an arrest and thus requires probable cause, and a confrontation of less than 20 minutes that is nonetheless considered a seizure requires reasonable suspicion.\(^{115}\) The assumption here, however, is that physical detentions are more intrusive than “virtual searches” of the type addressed in this provision.\(^{116}\) Thus, under proportionality reasoning, the justification required is ratcheted downward.

Other approaches to regulation of physical surveillance have been proposed, but they face insurmountable administrability problems. For instance, Susan Freiwald has answered the search question in terms of the extent to which the surveillance is hidden, intrusive, continuous and indiscriminate.\(^{117}\) While figuring out whether a police action is hidden or indiscriminate is relatively simple, the intrusiveness inquiry, as Professor Freiwald admits, “requires a judgment about levels of intrusiveness” and an assessment of “the richness of the information acquired.”\(^{118}\) She also provides no useful definition of “continuous.”\(^{119}\) Much more elaboration is needed if police and courts are to have any idea whether a particular investigative action is regulated. A similar comment can be made about a proposal from Mark Blitz that would regulate surveillance “that has the capacity to systematically track, or otherwise collect private information about [an] individual’s movements or other activities in ways that go meaningfully beyond the surveillance that is possible with unaided observation.”\(^{120}\)

\(^{111}\) County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of [the Fourth Amendment]”).

\(^{112}\) Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (finding a 20-minute stop reasonable, at least when the suspect is responsible for some of the delay). See also, ALLI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (1975) (permitting stops of up to 20 minutes).

\(^{113}\) See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS GOVERNING TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE 11 (1999) (hereafter ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE), Std. 2-9.2 (defining “legitimate law enforcement objective” as “detection, investigation, deterrence or prevention of crime, or apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal.”).

\(^{114}\) Kerr, supra note 15, at .

\(^{115}\) See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687-88; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (stating that “an investigative detention [on less than probable cause] must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” and holding a 15-minute detention in a small room to be the functional equivalent of arrest).

\(^{116}\) I have used the term “virtual searches” to refer to searches that do not require physical intrusion. See Slobogin, supra note 29, at 12.

\(^{117}\) Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.

\(^{118}\) Id. at *64-65.

\(^{119}\) Id. at *69-70.

\(^{120}\) Mark Blitz, United States v. Jones—and the Forms of Surveillance that May Be Left Unregulated in a Free Society, at http://wwwjones.com/2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-of-surveillance-that-may-be-left-unregulated-in-a-free-society/
leaves unanswered what “private information” is and when surveillance goes “meaningfully beyond” unaided observation (which in any event, as noted below, can be at least as intrusive as technologically-aided observation).

Rules based on duration are easier to understand and abide by. While precise time divisions such as those used in this provision are arbitrary in the sense that they apply regardless of how intrusive the search actually is, time limitations as a method of defining constitutional protections have a solid pedigree. The 48-hour period that defines when an arrestee must be taken to a magistrate, referenced above, is one example. While the Supreme Court has not been as rigid about when a stop becomes an arrest, its caselaw leans heavily on the durational element. A third example of a time-limited constitutional rule, from outside the search and seizure context, is the Court’s holding that two weeks marks the point at which police may reininitiate interrogation of a suspect who has asserted his right to counsel, even though the degree of coercion experienced by suspects can vary significantly over time depending upon a wide variety of circumstances. These types of prophylactic standards are a well-established method of construing many of the clauses in the Constitution, in recognition of the institutional limitations on rule-making. Congress has also relied on time periods as a means of distinguishing regulatory thresholds. Note three other aspects of the provision. First, this provision applies to naked eye observation as well as technologically-aided surveillance. Overt surveillance by the police can be just as intrusive as covert tracking or monitoring. Second, given the definition of “targeted” search, this provision applies not only to observation of suspicious people but also to targeted surveillance of places. Under this provision, government would need at least reasonable suspicion for targeted surveillance of a particular place that lasts longer than twenty minutes and probable cause when such surveillance exceeds 48 hours (with a new probable cause finding required after 30 days given the definition of “court order”). Third, no court order is required for short-term public searches or when exigency exists. Thus, for instance, if an officer legitimately stationed on a street corner observes suspicious activity that, over a twenty-minute period, develops into reasonable suspicion that requires the officer to follow the suspect, a court order would not be

121 See supra note 115. See also I.N.S. v. Delgado, 446 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (in finding that no seizure occurred, emphasizing that the confrontation lasted less than five minutes and also pointing out that the document check at the secondary checkpoint in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543 (1973), where the Court held that a seizure occurred, lasted up to five minutes).

122 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (“14 days . . . provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.”).

123 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI L. REV. 190, 208 (1988) (“Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must be authorized—indeed required—to consider their own, and the other branches’, limitations and propensities when they construct doctrine to govern future cases.”).

124 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (limiting electronic surveillance warrant to 30 days); 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (requiring a warrant for acquiring information in electronic storage for less than 180 days and only a subpoena for access to information in storage over 180 days).

125 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 277 (2002)(reporting a study in which participants ranked overt police observation of a person on the street to be as “intrusive” as overt camera surveillance and more intrusive than a 15-second roadblock stop).
necessary to continue the pursuit. Given the fast-moving nature of most street surveillance, the exigency exception would presumably apply very frequently in this setting.

(2) Targeted Data Searches

(a) A targeted data search of data held by an institutional third party that accumulates information about activities or transactions that take place over more than a 48-hour period requires a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist.

(b) A targeted data search of data held by an institutional third party that is not governed by (2)(a) requires a court order based on reasonable suspicion unless exigent circumstances exist.

Commentary: The commentary to II(1) explains the rationale for the 48-hour cut-off in this provision. Under this provision, only reasonable suspicion would be required to obtain phone or internet service provider logs detailing communications made by the target at a particular point in time. But probable cause would be required if the government sought data on calls made over more than a two-day period, a monthly bank record or credit card statement, or a medical record that describes symptom history.

Another approach to targeted data searches that would be consistent with proportionality reasoning would be to focus on the privacy interest associated with the type of record being accessed. Under this scheme, accessing medical records might require probable cause, whereas phone records might be accessible on something less. Either regulatory scheme is somewhat arbitrary and over- and under-inclusive in terms of accurately capturing relative intrusiveness. The proposed provision is more pragmatic, however, for reasons similar to those noted in connection with public searches. Differentiating the relative privacy interest in the various types and subtypes of records that law enforcement might seek (for instance, medical, bank, credit card, travel, phone, utility, real estate records) is a difficult chore that will inhibit the creation of clear rules. Furthermore, some records searches, such as those that occur in connection with data-mining, might access more than one type of record, and investigators cannot always know ahead of time the type of record they will be accessing.

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126 This is the approach I took in PRIVACY AT RISK. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 180-196.

127 For instance, the American Bar Association’s effort in this regard, in which I was involved, resulted in provisions that create four different types of institutional third party records (“highly private,” “moderately private,” minimally private” and “not private”) depending on application of four criteria (the extent to which the transfer of the information to a third party “is necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is social beneficial, including freedom of speech and association;” the extent to which the information is “personal,” “likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed” and otherwise would not be revealed outside “one’s social network;” the extent to which the information is accessible by persons other than the institutional third party; and the extent to which “existing law, including the law of privilege,” allows access to the information). AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS, Stds. 25-4.1 & 25-4.2 (2012) (hereafter ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS), available at www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards/law_enforcement_access.html.

128 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 584 (2009) (police “will necessarily collect information at the end of its dissemination, whereas judgments as to whether and when privacy is likely must be made prospectively. . . . As a result, the Fourth Amendment...
This provision rejects the third party doctrine, but only if the third party is an “institutional third party” (a commercial enterprise or government agency). It does not regulate acquisition of information in three other situations. First it does not govern access to records maintained by a non-institutional target. In United States v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court held that, when the records are in the possession of the person who is the focus of the investigation rather than a third party, a subpoena forcing production of the records will often be insufficient and a warrant may be required, for reasons having to do with the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, this provision does not apply to efforts at obtaining data from a non-institutional third party, such as a friend of the target. In these situations, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Even though this type of data acquisition would be a search under these provisions, the fact that a person, as opposed to an impersonal entity, has an autonomy interest in controlling information in his or her possession may require different treatment than when the third party is an institution. Third, this provision does not regulate data searches when the target is a commercial enterprise or government agency. This situation is governed by cases like United States v. Morton Salt, which hold that when the focus of an investigation is a business entity “mere official curiosity” might be sufficient ground for obtaining records. This approach is consistent with proportionality reasoning if one assumes that institutional entities have a much reduced privacy interest.

(3) General Public and Data Searches

(a) Public or data searches that are general in nature must be authorized by legislation or regulations issued pursuant to such legislation and may focus on a discrete group only if the group has meaningful access to the legislative process.

(b) Rules governing access to, storage of and analysis of information obtained in a general search must apply evenly or randomly to all members of the group, unless the requirements of II(1) and (2) are met.

rules that the police must apply ex ante must hinge on details of the history of information that they cannot know ex ante.”).


Id. at 44-45 (holding that the Fifth Amendments requires the government to show it has “prior knowledge” of the existence and authenticity of the specific documents it seeks to subpoena from the person who possesses the documents).

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”).

See SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 160 (“even if . . . one accepts the ‘social undercover agent’ cases as valid law, they are distinguishable from the ‘institutional undercover agent’ cases like Miller because social agents have an autonomy interest that institutional agents lack.”). If one agrees with this distinction, targets would not have standing to contest searches of non-institutional third parties.


Id. at 369 (“Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.”).

See F.C.C. v. AT & T, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (“The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations.”).
Commentary: This provision regulates searches that do not have a specific person or place as a target, but rather are aimed at observing or gathering information about large numbers of people, in the hope that crime will be detected or deterred. Under the Supreme Court’s third party doctrine, general public and data searches are not governed by the Fourth Amendment unless a physical trespass is somehow involved.\textsuperscript{136} If the Court were to hold that these types of government actions were searches, it would probably turn to its “special needs” analysis which, as noted above,\textsuperscript{137} would require individualized suspicion if the “primary purpose” of the general search is a “general interest in crime control,” but otherwise would grant deference to the government’s program. As applied, outcomes under this test are difficult to predict. A roadblock set up to detect narcotics is impermissible,\textsuperscript{138} but checkpoints to nab drunk drivers or to detect illegal immigrants at some distance from the border are not;\textsuperscript{139} a drug testing program for pregnant mothers is impermissible,\textsuperscript{140} but a drug testing program aimed at students in extracurricular activities is not.\textsuperscript{141}

This provision instead applies political process theory to general searches.\textsuperscript{142} It imposes three requirements on general search programs. First, they must be approved by a legislature. Many of the Court’s special needs cases involve general searches implemented by the executive branch, with no legislative input.\textsuperscript{143} Second, the group affected by the general search must have meaningful access to the legislative process. Admittedly, much rides on the word “meaningful.” One measure of this concept, noted earlier, would be the extent to which the general search will affect members of the legislature. As Justice Jackson stated, “There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”\textsuperscript{144} Third, as authorized and as implemented, the group search must affect everyone within the group equally. If instead persons or places are singled out, then the provisions regarding targeted searches are triggered.

Thus, for instance, a drone or camera surveillance system would be permissible under this provision only if the relevant municipal government approved it and the system covered the entire municipality or rotated its focus on a random or neutral basis. If instead the drones or cameras were programmed to

\textsuperscript{136} See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.

\textsuperscript{137} See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.


\textsuperscript{139} See id. at 37-38 (attempting to distinguish holding in Edmond from holdings in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 528 U.S. 443 (1976), which upheld a roadblock to detect illegal immigrants 66 miles north of the border) and Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), which upheld sobriety checkpoints).


\textsuperscript{142} The first author to do so was Richard Worf. See Richard Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 Touro L. Rev. 93 (2007).

\textsuperscript{143} See Slobogin, supra note 79, at 133-34.

monitor particular areas, reasonable suspicion or probable cause, depending upon
the length of the surveillance, would be required. Rather than “individualized
suspicion,” the justification in such cases could be based on statistical analysis of
crime within the area over the 30-day period of the court order. As another
example, a data-mining program run by the federal government that will access
monthly records would have to be authorized by Congress and would need to
apply to the entire country unless algorithms can produce, within a subset of
targets, evidence of crime against 50% of that subset during the time of the
warrant.145

Other Possible Provisions

A statute that comprehensively regulates public and data searches would also
contain provisions dealing with a number of other important issues. These
provisions would include post-search implementation matters such as whether and
when notice of the search is required, how long and under what conditions
information obtained during the search may be maintained, and the circumstances
under which this information may be disclosed. Provisions must also address
accountability issues, including remedies. The following discussion briefly
comments on these two general categories, relying in large part on work done by
the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section.

Post-Search Regulation

In the traditional search case, of course, the target knows that a search of his or
her house, person, papers or effects has occurred. Where searches are covert—
often the case when government uses technology—notice of a more formal nature
might be constitutionally required.146 In any event, notice is a useful way of
ensuring accountability because officials will know their targets will eventually
find out about the surveillance. Thus, the ABA Standards on Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records require notice to the target of a records search
within 30 days of their acquisition unless the records are only “minimally
protected.”147 The notice can be delayed if harm to public safety or the
investigation would result, but may only be dispensed with entirely “where it
would be unduly burdensome given the number of persons who must otherwise be
notified, taking into consideration, however, that the greater number of persons
indicates a greater intrusion into privacy.”148

The Supreme Court has suggested, without deciding, that the due process
clause requires law enforcement to keep a tight rein on information it
accumulates.149 The information obtained through public and data searches can be
voluminous and highly personal, so the duty to prevent leaks, hacking, and

145 For further elaboration, see Slobogin, supra note 79, at 191-96.
146 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (suggesting that post-surveillance notice is
constitutionally required in the electronic surveillance context).
147 ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 127, Std. 25-5.7 (2012).
148 Id.
149 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (stating that “[t]he right to collect and use . . .
data for public purposes . . . in some circumstances . . . arguably has its roots in the Constitution. . . .


dissemination to inappropriate persons is particularly strong in this context. The ABA’s Standards on Third Party Records contain a number of provisions governing these matters. For instance, the standards require that records be kept “reasonably secure from unauthorized access,”150 that all attempted and successful access to records that are moderately or highly protected be subject to audit,151 and that records be “destroyed according to an established schedule.”152 An example of this type of schedule from the physical surveillance setting comes from Baltimore, which destroys tapes from its surveillance cameras after 96 hours unless an incident within the cameras’ sightline is reported.153

The ABA’s standards also impose limitations on the disclosure of information obtained in data searches. In essence, the standards state that disclosure may occur only in connection with criminal investigation and training, or if necessary to protect the public.154 Other disclosures must be specifically authorized by law.155

Accountability

Accountability can be accomplished through a number of mechanisms. Already noted is the role notice and auditing can play. The ABA Standards on Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance also require the creation of “administrative rules which ensure that the information necessary for . . . accountability exists.”156 In short, some method of “watching the watchers” should be established.157 As another means of controlling discretion, the Standards require that law enforcement agencies conduct “periodic review . . . of the scope and effectiveness of technology-assisted physical surveillance” (review that would be automatic under the 30-day rule imposed in the proposed statute) and that the agencies “maintain[] and [make] available to the public general information about the type of types of surveillance being used and the frequency of their use.”158

As to sanctions that might be imposed for violation of the rules, administrative punishment, damages, injunctions, and criminal prosecution can all be on the table, in addition to the traditional Fourth Amendment remedy of exclusion. I have expressed a preference for a damages action over exclusion even in the traditional search context.159 Some sort of alternative to exclusion—a remedy that applies

150 ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 127, Std. 25-6.1(a)(1).
151 Id. at (b)(1).
152 Id. at (b)(2).
154 ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 127, Std. 25-6.2.
155 Id. Some have argued that, if these types of disclosure rules exist, rules limiting access to information are not necessary. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183-84(2002). I take issue with that conclusion in SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 13-32; 199-201.
156 ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 113, at 13, Std. 2-9.1(f)(i).
157 This phrase comes from DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 334 (1998).
158 ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 113, at 13-14, Stds. 2-9.1(f)(iv) & (v).
159 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363. However, I have also argued that, as a method of deterring pretextual use of general public and data searches, evidence found during such a search that is not related to its purpose (e.g., cocaine found during a terrorist-prevention surveillance program) could be excluded. Slobogin, supra note 79, at 142-43.
only in criminal cases—is even more important where technology allows government to access information about thousands of innocent people who will never have the option of invoking the rule. Furthermore, the suppression remedy is a poor fit for violation of post-search rules, like those dealing with notice and dissemination, that do not involve illegal access to excludable information.

Conclusion

The statute proposed in this article attempts to implement mosaic theory through application of two frames for thinking about the Fourth Amendment: the proportionality principle and political process theory. It answers the four questions left open after Jones as follows:

1. Differentiating between short-term and long-term physical surveillance can be justified under proportionality analysis, and clear, if somewhat arbitrary, distinctions based on the duration of the surveillance can be established.
2. Physical surveillance (including, but not limited to, tracking) should not always require probable cause or a warrant. Proportionality analysis suggests that reasonable suspicion or an even lower standard is an adequate justification for government actions that are only moderately or minimally intrusive.
3. The nature of the offense should normally not affect the justification required by proportionality reasoning. The one exception occurs when a search is necessary to prevent a serious, specific threat.
4. Proportionality reasoning should also apply when government engages in institutional data searches. The third party doctrine should be discarded in this situation; instead, justification should be required for data access, but should vary depending upon the length of time over which the sought-after transactions occurred.

The statute also addresses a number of questions not raised in Jones. It redefines search for Fourth Amendment purposes to conform to its lay meaning. It defines probable cause and reasonable suspicion more definitively than the caselaw does, by providing that probable cause searches must be likely to obtain significant

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160 Another issue not addressed by the proposed statute is standing to challenge a public or data search. See Kerr, supra note 15, at . Under the Court’s current jurisprudence only the person whose own privacy interests have been intruded upon has standing. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (Fourth Amendment standing depends upon whether the individual has a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”). Under that standing rule for invoking exclusion or seeking damages, in practical effect there would be no remedy for many public and data searches. The preferable standing rule, which is arguably required when the goal of a constitutional rule is deterrence, is target or universal standing. Arnold Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 907, 939 (1989) (“when obtaining evidence is the constitutional wrong, [the proposed remedy] should be subjected to a cost/benefit analysis. If allowing third-party standing would deter the objectionable practice, such standing should be permitted.”). But see supra note 132.

161 SLOBOGIN, supra note 51, at 133-34.
evidence of crime, while permitting reasonable suspicion searches that are likely to
discover leads to such evidence. It also introduces the idea that general searches—
searches of groups in the absence of suspicion—should be regulated differently
than targeted searches, through reliance on political process theory.

As important as the content of these proposals is the method of explicating
them. Construction of statutes regulating government investigation is crucial, for a
number of reasons. First, implementation of Fourth Amendment theory through
statutory provisions requires confrontation with the implications of that theory.
Until theoreticians are forced to put their prescriptions into action, the logic and
feasibility of their proposals cannot be fully evaluated. Second, by providing a
template for legislatures, a statutory proposal increases the probability that
legislatures will get involved in the process of regulating searches, which itself has
several advantages. As Justice Alito suggested in Jones, legislatures are better
equipped than courts bound by the case and controversy requirement and judicial
restraint to provide detailed and comprehensive regulations.162 And courts can do
a better job evaluating the constitutionality of a given practice if a statute provides
them with the framework in which it occurs.163 For instance, courts might think
quite differently about justification requirements if they know that the government
is constrained by rules governing notice, disclosure and accountability.

Another advantage legislation is said to have over judicial analysis, also raised
by Justice Alito, is that legislatures can be more responsive than courts to changes
in the technology used to carry out searches.164 If the proposed statute is adopted,
however, this advantage would be muted, because regulation would not be driven
by the method of investigation. A search would occur whenever government is
looking for evidence of wrongdoing, regardless of how it does so, and justification
levels would be set according to the duration of the search, not the type of
technology used or the type of information sought. This approach is not only
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s language and history, but should be able
to accommodate even significant changes in the way government chooses to
investigate its citizens.

162 132 S.Ct. at 964. See also Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the “land of Oz”: Lessons for America, 81 J. CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 129-130 (1999) (“Since Supreme Court rulemaking is limited by the Court’s docket, the facts of the cases before it, and its frequent unwillingness to ‘mandate a code of behavior for state officials,’ the result is patchwork of rules that cover some, but ignore equally important aspects of criminal procedure.”).

163 Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 800-02 (1970) (given the lack of statutory and regulatory search and seizure law, “[t]he Court cannot know whether the conduct before it is typical or atypical, unconnected or connected with a set of other practices or—if there is some connection—what is the comprehensive shape of the set of practices involved, what are their relations, their justifications, their consequences.”).

164 132 S.Ct. at 964 (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). See also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (“Technological change may reveal the institutional limits of the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal procedure, exposing the need for statutory guidance when technology is changing rapidly.”).